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COMPETING WITH DELAWARE: RECENT AMENDMENTS 
TO OHIO’S CORPORATE STATUTES 
David Porter* 
In October 2006, Ohio House Bill 3011 became law, amending 
Ohio’s corporation and other business entity statutes as part of a 
continuous effort to keep those statutes modern and to maintain Ohio’s 
competitiveness as a business domicile. House Bill 301 is evolutionary, 
not revolutionary, in its content, but its changes are nonetheless 
significant for Ohio corporations and their lawyers. To place these 
changes in context, this article summarizes corporate statutory 
developments since 1997 that highlight Ohio’s previous initiatives to 
keep up with Delaware, America’s dominant state of incorporation,2 and 
then discusses at greater length the recent amendments contained in 
House Bill 301, concluding with a look ahead at some additional 
changes that may occur as early as this year. 
A discussion of Ohio corporate law developments requires 
introduction of the Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar 
Association (“OSBA”), an active organization of lawyers from around 
the state who practice in the business entity field and who volunteer their 
time to develop proposals for statutory change. The Committee, which 
meets twice annually but operates throughout the year through active 
subcommittees, is the primary source for Ohio legislation in the 
corporate, limited liability company, and partnership field. Even 
 
* David Porter is a Partner in the Cleveland Office of Jones Day, and he serves as Vice Chair of the 
Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association.  The views expressed are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of his Firm, the Committee, or his colleagues.  
This article is derived in part from materials presented in seminars by the author on behalf of the 
Ohio Division of Securities and the Ohio State Bar Association.  The author thanks his colleagues 
Jeanne Rickert and Jennifer Lewis, as well as John C. Evans, a law student, who collaborated in the 
preparation of some of those materials. 
 1. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).  The text of the bill is available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=126_HB_301. 
 2. See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2004). 
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legislative proposals in these fields developed by non-OSBA proponents 
often evolve during the legislative process into bills that are primarily 
the Committee’s work product before the Legislature adopts them.3 
One of the invaluable services that the Corporation Law Committee 
provides is the creation of official “Committee Comments” for 
legislation that it originates. These comments, while not acts of the 
Legislature and not prepared by the official drafting service support arm 
of the Legislature, known as the Legislative Service Commission,4 are a 
statement by experienced practitioners in the field as to what the 
legislation is intended to do. As such, and because the more official 
summaries of the Legislative Service Commission are produced by 
persons less familiar with the corporate law arena, the Corporation Law 
Committee’s comments are relevant to Ohio judges who are faced with 
interpreting Ohio’s laws.5 
One of the major tasks of the Corporation Law Committee is to 
monitor developments in business entity law in other states, especially 
Delaware. Delaware competes with the 49 other states to be a situs for 
incorporations, and the franchise and filing fees it charges corporations 
are a significant revenue generator for its government.6 That Delaware is 
a successful competitor is demonstrated by the numbers: More than 50% 
of publicly traded companies in the United States are incorporated in 
Delaware.7 In a 2003 survey, 216 members of the Fortune 500 were 
incorporated in Delaware despite being headquartered elsewhere, and 
 
 3. See Thompson Hine.com, Changes to Ohio Law in Response to TRW/Northrop Takeover 
Contest, http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/publication12.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 4. The Ohio Legislative Service Commission (LSC) is a nonpartisan agency providing 
drafting, fiscal, research, training, and other technical and legislative services to the Ohio General 
Assembly.  Ohio Legislative Service Commission, About LSC, http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/ 
about.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). In addition to revising legislative language for conformity to 
its standards, the LSC also prepares analyses of each legislative bill for the benefit of the legislators.  
Id. These analyses include bill analyses that explain, in relatively plain English, the language of the 
bill as it progresses through each house, while fiscal analyses describe the fiscal impact of the bill. 
Id.  The Commission also prepares synopses of amendments to each bill as made by the various 
legislative committees. Id.  See also Ohio Legislative Service Commission Home Page, 
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) for additional information. 
 5. See Lake v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 206 N.E.2d 566, 569-70 (Ohio 1965). See also 
Reynolds v. Wingers, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)(quoting from the 
Corporation Law Committee comments). 
 6. Delaware Fiscal Notebook (2005), available at http://www.state.de.us/finance/ 
publications/fiscal_notebook_05/Section02/sec2page24.pdf.  In 2005, franchise fees paid by 
corporations and other entities to the State of Delaware generated $502 million, or over 17% of the 
state’s general fund revenues.  Id. 
 7. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 135. See also Feng Chen, Kenton Yee & Yong KeunYoo, Are 
Delaware Firms Oranges? Fundamental Attributes and the Delaware Effect, 1ST ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=912942. 
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the five next-most-successful states that compete for out-of-state 
incorporations netted only 27 of the Fortune 500.8 
In the 2003 survey, Ohio was the situs of the corporate headquarters 
for 192, or 2.94%, of all U.S. publicly traded companies, but the state of 
incorporation for only 112, or 1.72%.9 Ohio had corporate headquarters 
for 21, or 5.68%, of the Fortune 500, but was the place of incorporation 
for only 13, or 3.51%, of the Fortune 500.10 Nearly all Ohio-based 
corporations that choose to be incorporated in another state are Delaware 
corporations.11 
The most commonly ascribed reasons for Delaware’s current 
competitive success include the strength of its business court.12 
Delaware uses a separate Court of Chancery that removes business entity 
cases from the general litigation pool.13 Also there are tremendous 
advantages to sharing experiences among the already large pool of 
Delaware corporations. Legal experience from one Delaware corporation 
is readily transferable to another Delaware corporation because they 
operate under a common set of rules.14 These factors re-enforce one 
another, as one commentator has said, “The quality of future case law 
depends on the number and diversity of lawsuits brought before the 
courts. These factors, in turn, depend on the number of firms 
incorporated in the state.”15 As a result, Delaware’s corporate law 
 
 8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553, 556 (2002). 
 9. Id. at 566-67. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. & 
ECON. 383, 392-393 (2003). 
 12. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 580. 
 13. The Delaware Division of Corporations’ website proclaims: 
More than half a million business entities have their legal home in Delaware including 
more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500.  
Businesses choose Delaware because we provide a complete package of incorporation 
services including modern and flexible corporate laws, our highly-respected Court of 
Chancery, a business-friendly State Government, and the customer service oriented Staff 
of the Delaware Division of Corporations. 
State of Delaware, Division of Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
The Delaware Court of Chancery’s website goes so far as to proclaim: 
The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely recognized as the nation’s preeminent forum 
for the determination of disputes involving the internal affairs of the thousands upon 
thousands of Delaware corporations and other business entities through which a vast 
amount of the world’s commercial affairs is conducted. Its unique competence in and 
exposure to issues of business law are unmatched.  
First State Judiciary- Court of Chancery Welcome!, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ 
Court%20of%20Chancery/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
 14. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 586-88. 
 15. Id. at 586. 
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(codified in the Delaware General Corporation Law, or “DGCL”) is 
widely influential far beyond its borders. 
I.  1997-2006 – A DECADE OF CHANGE 
Since 1997, the Ohio Legislature, most often as the result of 
initiatives from the OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee, has made 
numerous changes to chapter 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code (the 
“ORC”), sometimes called Ohio’s “General Corporation Law.” Many 
basic features of Ohio corporate law—such as whether shareholders 
have pre-emptive rights, whether directors may fix voting rights for 
preferred shares, the means for shareholder and director 
communications, and the creation or amendment of corporate 
regulations and articles by directors—have been changed in fundamental 
ways.16 Although a few of the changes during the period were intrinsic 
to Ohio’s anti-takeover laws,17 which are very dissimilar to Delaware 
law, most of the changes were directly responsive to the desire to keep 
Ohio corporate law competitive with Delaware.18 
The following chronology lists the most significant changes to 
chapter 1701 from 1997 through 2006: 
 
 
Year 
 
Effect of Amendment 
 
Ohio Statutory 
Reference 
 
Comparable Delaware  
Provisions 
1997 Amended provisions 
of Ohio’s Control 
Share Acquisition Act 
in response to 
questions raised in 
litigation19 
Title 17, sections 
1701.01(Z), 
1701.831, and 
1701.832 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
N/A (Delaware has no 
counterpart to the 
Control Share 
Acquisition Act) 
1998 Reduced minimum 
size of board 
Title 17, section 
1701.63(A) of 
Title 8, section 141(c) of 
the Delaware Code 
 
 16. See infra pp. 5-11 for a chronology of changes. 
 17. See infra notes 19 and 36 
 18. See infra page 11 for a breakdown of legislative purposes. 
 19. H.B. 170, 122nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997).  The legislation responded to 
questions raised by Judge Graham in United Dominion Industries, Ltd. v. Commercial Intertech 
Corp, 943 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Ohio 1996).  In that case, Judge Graham upheld the constitutionality 
of 1990 amendments to Ohio’s Control Share Acquisition Act but invited changes, which were 
subsequently implemented by the legislature. Id. at 862-64. 
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committees from 3 
directors to 120 
the Ohio Revised 
Code 
allows for single 
director committees) 
1999 Authorized use of 
electronic proxies21 
Title 17, section 
1701.48 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 212 of 
the Delaware Code 
authorized delivery of 
proxies by electronic 
communications22 
2000 Eliminated 
requirement for a 
statement of 
corporation’s purpose 
in the articles of 
incorporation23 
Title 17, section 
1701.04 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
 
Title 8, section 
102(a)(3) of the 
Delaware Code retains a 
purpose clause 
requirement comparable 
to the former Ohio 
provision24 
 Allowed board to fix 
voting terms of blank 
check preferred 
Title 17, section 
1701.06(A)(12) 
of the Ohio 
Title 8, section 
102(a)(4) of the 
Delaware Code allowed 
 
 20. H.B. 579, 122nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997). 
 21. H.B. 6, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). House Bill 6 is an example of a 
legislative proposal originated by others that was amended by substituting language prepared by the 
OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee covering the same topic. See Thomas Geyer, Sub H.B. 6 
Authorizes Electronic Proxies and Makes Technical Changes to 1707, Ohio Securities Bulletin, 
Issue 99:2, available at http://www.securities.state.oh.us/Bulletin/BUL992.pdf. 
 22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2006). 
 23. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). 
 24. Title 8, section 102(a)(3) of the Delaware Code retains a requirement that the certificate of 
incorporation recite: 
The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted. It shall be sufficient 
to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the 
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be 
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all 
lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except for 
express limitations, if any. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2006). 
 25. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999).  As stated in the Corporation Law 
Committee’s comments on the legislation: 
Previous law expressly permitted the directors, if authorized in the articles of 
incorporation, to adopt amendments to the articles to fix or change certain of the terms of 
a class or series of shares that had not yet been issued.  However, previous law did not 
permit the directors to determine the voting rights of a class or series, and it was not 
clear whether it conferred upon directors the authority to determine whether or not 
dividends would be cumulative or the relative preferences of a series or class of shares.  
These limitations and uncertainties made [the existing provisions] of limited utility. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.06 cmt. (Ohio General Corporation Law Committee comment) 
(reprinted in PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 18 
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shares25 Revised Code directors to fix voting 
rights of preferred 
shares 
 Allowed directors to 
create regulations for 
new corporations26 
Title 17, section 
1701.10 of the 
Ohio 
Revised Code 
Title 8, section 109 of 
the Delaware Code 
allowed directors to 
adopt bylaws 
 Eliminated statutory 
pre-emptive rights in 
new corporations27  
Title 17, section 
1701.15 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 102 of 
the Delaware Code 
provided that there were 
no statutory pre-emptive 
rights 
2002 Authorized expanded 
use of “cyberspace” 
meetings of directors 
and shareholders28 
Title 17, sections 
1701.11 
(regulation 
provisions on 
meeting locus), 
1701.40 (where 
meetings can be 
held), 1701.42 
(waiver of 
notices), 1701.51 
(quorum for 
shareholder 
meetings), 
1701.61 (director 
meetings), 
1701.62 (quorum 
for director 
meetings) of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Various sections of the 
Delaware Code were 
amended in 2000 to 
contain similar 
provisions29 
 
(Michael A. Ellis ed 2005). 
 26. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). 
 27. See id.  The amendment sets a trap for the unwary practitioner: it maintains statutory pre-
emptive rights for corporations organized prior to the bill’s effective date of March 17, 2000, 
eliminating such rights for corporations organized on or after that date unless they opt into the new 
regime. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.15(C) (West 2006).  The trap is heightened by the failure of 
generally available compilations of Ohio statutes to contain a copy of the historic provisions. See, 
e.g., PAGE’S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (LexisNexis); BALDWIN’S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West). 
 28. H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). 
 29. S.B. 363, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess.  (Del. 1999). 
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 Authorized expanded 
use of electronic 
communications 
to/from shareholders30 
Title 17, sections 
1701.25 (express 
terms of shares), 
1701.37 (use of 
email addresses), 
1701.38 
(delivery of 
financial 
statements), 
1701.41 (notices 
of meetings), 
1701.54 (written 
actions), 1701.69 
(notice regarding 
amendments to 
the articles), 
1701.80 and 
1701.801 
(notices 
regarding 
subsidiary/parent 
mergers), and 
additional 
conforming 
sections of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Various sections of the 
Delaware Code were 
amended in 2000 to 
contain similar 
provisions31 
 Expanded authority of 
the directors to amend 
corporate articles to 
(1) change the name of 
the corporation, (2) 
change its principal 
place of business, (3) 
increase the number of 
shares to make or 
Title 17, sections 
1701.70 (powers 
to amend 
articles) and  
1701.73 (notice 
to shareholder of 
amendments) of 
the Ohio Revised 
Code 
The Delaware Code has 
no directly 
corresponding 
provisions33 
 
 30. H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). 
 31. S.B. 363, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess.  (Del. 1999). 
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reflect a stock 
split/stock dividend32 
 Prohibited removal of 
directors, without 
cause, in an issuing 
public company that 
has a classified 
board34 
Title 17, section 
1701.11 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 141(k) 
of the Delaware Code 
prohibited removal of 
directors on a classified 
board without cause  
 Authorized pre-filing 
of articles of 
incorporation to allow 
selection of a future 
incorporation date35 
Title 17, section 
1701.04(E) of 
the Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 103(d) 
of the Delaware Code 
provided for pre-filing 
of certificates of 
incorporation 
2003 Amended provisions 
of Ohio’s Control 
Share Acquisition Act 
in response to 
questions raised in 
litigation36 
Title 17, sections 
1701.01(Z) and 
1701.831 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
N/A (Delaware has no 
counterpart to the 
Control Share 
Acquisition Act) 
200637 Provided limited 
authority for directors 
to amend existing 
corporate regulations38 
Title 17, sections 
1701.10 and 
1701.11 (power 
to amend) and 
additional 
sections to limit 
power of the 
Title 8, section 109 of 
the Delaware Code 
allowed delegation of 
power to directors to 
amend bylaws  
 
 32. H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). 
 33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242.  However, under title 28 section 253 of the Delaware Code, 
Delaware directors can effect a name change for the corporation through a merger with a subsidiary 
of which the corporation owns at least 90% of each class of outstanding shares. 
 34. S.B. 110, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).  This bill is another example of 
legislation that was originated by others but heavily modified through comments and substituted 
language provided by the Corporation Law Committee. See Linda Wooden, Vice President of Gov’t 
Affairs with the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Testimony on Sub. S.B. 110 (Oct. 17, 2001) available 
at http://www.ohiochamber.com/governmental/testimonySB110.asp. 
 35. H. B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). 
 36. H.B. 7, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg Sess. (Ohio 2001).  The changes implemented were the 
result of decisions by Judge Manos in Northrop Grumman Corp. v. TRW, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12905 (N.D. Ohio April 18, 2002). 
 37. All 2006 amendments are contained in H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 
2006). 
 38. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.10(A) and 1701.11(A)(1) (West 2006).  See infra notes 
82-99 and accompanying text. 
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Ohio Revised 
Code 
 Broadened the types of 
consideration that can 
be received for 
shares39 
Title 17, sections 
1701.18 and 
1701.19 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 153 of 
the Delaware Code was 
amended in 2004 to 
permit broader forms of 
consideration in the 
issuance of shares 40 
 Allowed subsidiary 
spin-offs without a 
shareholder vote41 
Title 17, section 
1701.76 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Delaware Code 
analogous provision, 
Title 8, section 271, 
does not apply to spin-
offs by dividend 
 Permitted holding 
company formations 
without shareholder 
vote42 
Title 17, section 
1701.802 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 251(g) 
of the Delaware Code 
permitted holding 
company formations 
 Allowed conversions 
into other forms of 
entities43 
Title 17, section 
1701.801 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, sections 265 and 
266 of the Delaware 
Code permitted 
conversions into other 
forms of entities 
 Clarified that directors 
may delegate option-
granting authority to 
officers44 
Title 17, section 
1701.17 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 157(c) of 
the Delaware Code 
provided for delegation 
of option-granting 
authority to officers 
 Clarified that board 
committees may 
delegate their authority 
to subcommittees45 
Title 17, section 
1701.63 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 
141(c)(3) of the 
Delaware Code 
provided for delegation 
to subcommittees 
 
 39. Id. §§ 1701.18; 1701.19. See also infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. 
 40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 326 (2004). 
 41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (West 2006). See also infra notes 104-06 and 
accompanying text. 
 42. Id. § 1701.802. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
 43. Id. § 1701.801. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text. 
 44. Id. § 1701.17. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. 
 45. Id. § 1701.63. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
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 Broadened the 
corporate actions that 
can be made pursuant 
to an order of a federal 
bankruptcy court46 
Title 17, section 
1701.75 of the 
Ohio Revised 
Code 
Title 8, section 303 of 
the Delaware Code had 
been amended in 2004 
to the same effect47 
 
An analysis of these 21 significant changes to Ohio’s corporation 
law during the past decade breaks down as follows: 
• Aligning Ohio more closely with Delaware:17 
• Ohio anti-takeover provisions (no Delaware equivalent): 2 
• Other divergences from Delaware: 2 
The foregoing ratio of 17:2:2 is somewhat misleading, in that it 
would give one a sense that Ohio slavishly follows Delaware in most 
regards. That would somewhat overstate the situation, as many of the 
Ohio provisions diverge in at least minor ways from choices made by 
Delaware. What would be fair to say is that Ohio lawyers and legislators 
have, in most areas, adapted concepts tested in Delaware to a uniquely 
Ohio framework. 
Not all developments in Delaware are viewed as necessary or 
appropriate for Ohio.48 Nor does Ohio follow all of the developments in 
the Model Business Corporation Act [hereinafter “MBCA”], created 
under the auspices of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the 
American Bar Association.49 Both chapter 1701 and the DGCL, while 
sometimes influenced by the MBCA, have evolved separately, leading to 
a divergence in language, defined terms, and substantive content. This 
divergence in style and content requires the Ohio practitioner who works 
with both Delaware and Ohio corporations to stay keenly aware of the 
 
 46. Id. § 1701.75. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. 
 47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 326 (2006). 
 48. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Symposium: 
Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley 
Governance Issues: The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1749, 1763 n. 60 (2006). 
 49. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf.  Some of the amendments adopted in H. B. 78 in 2000 
reflected changes in the MBCA that were reviewed by the Corporation Law Committee and 
proposed for adoption in Ohio. H.B. 78, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999). For example, 
the elimination of the requirement for a corporate purpose clause in section 1701.04 follows the 
guide of the MBCA—the Committee comment to that amendment says “Following the lead of the 
[MBCA], the requirement of a statement of purpose has been deleted as being purely formalistic but 
a statement is allowed by way of limitation.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04 cmt. (Ohio General 
Corporation Law Committee comment) (reprinted in PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, 
supra note 25, at 14-15). 
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differences between the two states, as confusion can easily occur. 
Although the changes outlined in the table above have reduced the 
substantive differences between Ohio and Delaware corporate law in 
many technical areas, there remains a fundamental difference between 
the two states in their attitude toward corporate governance. Delaware 
may – as is the case of Liberia or Panama when it comes to “flags of 
convenience” for shipping—be looked upon as a “situs of convenience” 
for incorporation by chartering corporations that have no real contact 
with Delaware.50 Ohio’s corporations, on the other hand, are largely 
native to its soil, are given their charter by the State for the benefit of the 
State and its citizens, and still maintain sizable operations within the 
state.51 The perceived connection between corporations that are 
organized in Ohio, Ohio jobs, and the Ohio economy has led the Ohio 
legislature to provide strong anti-takeover statutes to protect them.52 So 
Ohio, in giving directors of Ohio corporations the discretion to consider 
constituencies other than shareholders in making any decision,53 has 
directly renounced some of the doctrines created by the Delaware Court 
of Chancery that have arisen in takeover cases.54 And it has adopted 
more favorable provisions in protecting directors against lawsuits55 and 
in obtaining indemnification.56 Similarly, Ohio’s Legislature has, 
through provisions such as the “anti-arbitrageur” language of the Control 
 
 50. Greenfield, supra note 2, at 136. Greenfield identified only two Fortune 500 companies 
(one of which, MBNA, was subsequently acquired) actually headquartered in Delaware. Id. The 
largest company then incorporated in Delaware, Wal-Mart (which is headquartered in Bentonville, 
Arkansas), has more than double the number of employees than Delaware has residents, and 
Delaware corporations’ employees in Delaware account for an infinitesimal fraction of those 
corporations’ total employee base.  Id. 
 51. See generally  Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 11. 
 52. See supra notes 19 and 36 (highlighting Ohio’s anti-takeover statutes). 
 53. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(1) (West 2006).  In contrast, Delaware provides that 
corporate directors owe their fiduciary duties to shareholders, and obligations toward other 
constituencies are excluded.  Greenfield, supra note 2, at 137. 
 54. § 1701.59(C) (making clear that a director retains the benefit of the business judgment 
rule even in a corporate takeover situation, thereby renouncing the “Unocal/Unitrin doctrine” 
enunciated by the Delaware courts). See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 55. § 1701.59(D) (imposing the burden on a plaintiff to prove with ‘clear and convincing” 
evidence that a director’s actions violate the statutory standards). 
 56. Id. § 1701.13(E)(5) (limiting the obligation of a director to return an advancement of costs 
by requiring proof by “clear and convincing evidence . . . that his action or failure to act involved an 
act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken 
with deliberate disregard for the best interests of the corporation”). Coupled with the constituency 
provisions and other protections of section 1701.59, this severely limits the circumstances under 
which an advancement of funds would need to be repaid. 
11
Porter: Ohio's Changing Corporation Laws
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
PORTERFINAL.DOC 3/19/2007  12:23:14 PM 
186 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:175 
Share Acquisition Act57 and the profit disgorgement provisions of the 
Control Bid provisions of the state securities laws,58 sought to minimize 
the impact of quick-buck seeking, short-term investors, thereby favoring 
the interests of longer-term investors. At the same time, Ohio balances 
these anti-takeover provisions with a shareholder-centric approach to 
many fundamental corporate governance changes. For example, Ohio’s 
statutes allow shareholders to amend the articles of incorporation59 or 
regulations60 without board approval. 
Thus the task for those who work on updating and refreshing 
Ohio’s corporation laws is to try to eliminate mechanical differences 
between the functioning of title 17, section 1701 of the Ohio Revised 
Code and title 8 of the Delaware Code while maintaining the special 
values inherent in Ohio’s laws. And that is precisely how the corporate 
provisions of House Bill 301 came about. 
II.  HOUSE BILL 301 
House Bill 301 contains ten substantive amendments to Title 17, 
section 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code, that: 
• Give directors authority to amend regulations, with some 
limitations (existing corporations may need to opt into this 
provision);61 
• Allow spin-offs without a shareholder vote;62 
• Permit holding company formations without a shareholder 
vote;63 
 
 57. Title 17, section 1701.831 of the Ohio Revised Code, together with its associated 
definitions contained in Section 1701.01, is commonly known as the Ohio Control Share 
Acquisition Act.  Section 1701.831(E) requires approval of a control share acquisition by holders of 
a majority of the voting power in the election of directors (thus typically a majority of the 
outstanding shares) and also holders of majority of that voting power excluding the voting power of 
“interested shares.”  Section 1701.01(CC)(1)(d), adopted in the 1990 amendments to the Act, added 
to the definition of “interested shares” those shares held by persons who acquire “such shares for 
valuable consideration beginning with the date of the first public disclosure of a proposal for, or 
expression of interest in, a control share acquisition. . . .”  As the most likely purchasers of shares in 
this situation are arbitrageurs, the provision is commonly known as the “anti-arbitrageur provision.” 
 58. §§1707.041, 1707.42 and 1707.43 (West 2006) (control bid statutes).  Section 1707.43, in 
particular, can force disgorgement of profits by a person who announces a control bid but fails to 
consummate the bid. 
 59. Id. § 1701.71. 
 60. Id. § 1701.11. 
 61. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.11 (A)(1)(d) (West 2006)). 
 62. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.76 (West 2006)). 
 63. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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• Allow conversions from one form of entity to another;64 
• Clarify that directors may delegate option grant authority to 
officers;65 
• Clarify that Board committees may create and delegate 
their authority to subcommittees;66 
• Allow SEC reports to serve as notice of Board-adopted 
amendments to the articles;67 
• Broaden the types of consideration for which shares and 
limited liability membership interests may be issued;68 
• Allow corporate actions to be taken by bankruptcy court 
decree in liquidation proceedings as well as in 
reorganizations;69 and 
• Allow reliance on corporate good standing certificates for 
up to seven days (helping to resolve legal opinion issues).70 
In addition to these provisions amending Title 17, chapter 1701, 
House Bill 301 includes amendments affecting limited liability 
companies, partnerships and Ohio’s securities laws, that: 
• Require notice to the Ohio Division of Securities of 
material changes to tender offers; 71 
• Allow regulations of the Ohio Division of Securities to 
change automatically with SEC rule changes;72 
• Limit the fiduciary duties of those who provide goods or 
services to business entities73 in response to the decision of 
the Ohio Supreme Court in Arpadi v. First MSP Corp.;74 
 
§ 1701.802 (West 2006)). 
 64. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.782, 1701.792, 1701.811, and 1701.821 (West 2006)). 
 65. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.17(B)(1) (West 2006)). 
 66. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.63(G) (West 2006)). 
 67. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.73(A)(3) (West 2006)). 
 68. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.18(A)(1) (West 2006)). 
 69. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.75(A) (West 2006)). 
 70. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.92(D) (West 2006)). 
 71. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). 
 72. See id. 
 73. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.921 (West 2006)). 
 74. 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994). 
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and 
• Clarify aspects of partnership law.75 
The following discussion describes in more detail the corporate 
entity provisions of House Bill 301. Although most of the provisions of 
House Bill 301, including all of the corporate and securities provisions, 
were developed with OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee,76 the 
provisions of House Bill 301 that address Arpadi and clarified aspects of 
partnership law were not changes proposed by the Corporation Law 
Committee. This article does not address those provisions or the changes 
to the securities laws. 
A. Providing Directors With Authority To Amend Regulations 
Ohio has long stood apart from other states by requiring any 
changes to the regulations (called “bylaws” in Delaware and many other 
states) to be approved by shareholders.77 Title 8, section 109 of the 
Delaware Code allows directors to both adopt the initial regulations and, 
if expressly authorized by the certificate of incorporation (as is the norm 
in practice), to amend regulations.78 Ohio previously made a partial 
adjustment toward the Delaware position by the 2000 amendments to 
Title 17, section 1701.10 of the Ohio Revised Code that permitted 
directors to adopt regulations for a newly organized corporation if done 
so within 90 days of its organization.79 
In the author’s experience, the Ohio approach of limiting the 
directors’ authority regarding the regulations created significant, and 
unnecessary, problems for Ohio corporations. For example, when the 
 
 75. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). 
 76. David P. Porter, Jeanne M. Rickert, Randall M. Walters & Jennifer C. Lewis, 
Amendments to Ohio’s Business Entity Statutes Effective in October 2006, JONES DAY 
COMMENTARIES, http://www1.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3729. 
 77. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.10 (Anderson 1996). 
 78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
 79. The Corporation Law Committee’s comment to H. B. 78, recited: 
Under Sections 1701.09 and 1701.19 as previously enacted, the only way to organize an 
Ohio corporation was for the incorporators to issue shares, the shareholders to elect 
directors and adopt regulations and the directors to elect officers.  Following [Revised 
Model Corporation Act] §2.05, Section 1701.10 has been revised to add alternative 
methods of organization by allowing initial directors named in the articles to adopt 
regulations and complete the organization of the corporation or allowing the 
incorporators to select the initial directors who will complete the organization of the 
corporation.  Section 1701.10 retains the principle that after the organizational period, 
regulations may be adopted or amended only by the shareholders.  
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.09 cmt (Ohio General Corporation Law Committee comment) 
(reprinted in PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, supra note 25, at 24). 
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provisions of title 17, section 1701.48 of the Ohio Revised Code were 
amended in 199980 to permit the use of internet, telephonic and other 
means of transmitting proxies, many Ohio corporations were unable to 
make use of the new authority granted by the Legislature because their 
existing regulations included language that required proxies to be “by a 
writing signed by [the shareholder],” paralleling the former statutory 
language. Before using the new electronic proxy authority, the 
corporation had to first go to its shareholders and amend the prior 
regulations to eliminate the restriction. This meant that many public 
companies, for whom the new authority potentially would mean 
significant cost savings, were not only faced with a year’s delay in 
reaping the benefits of the new statute, but also had their proxy process 
made more difficult and costly for the year in which they sought the 
amendment to the regulations due to a longer SEC process.81 
In a change that reflects a compromise between retention of Ohio’s 
historically shareholder-centric standards and a total shift to the board-
controlled bylaws practices common in other states, House Bill 301 
amended title 17, section 1701.11 of the Ohio Revised Code to give the 
directors limited authority to amend corporate regulations.82 This 
authority may be granted either by the shareholders or be contained in 
original regulations adopted by the directors upon incorporation.83 
Directors cannot, however, be authorized to amend provisions of the 
regulations that: 
• Specify the percentage of shares a shareholder must hold in 
order to call a shareholders meeting;84 
• Specify the length of the time period required for notice of 
a shareholders meeting;85 
• Specify that shares that have not yet been fully paid can 
have voting rights;86 
• Specify requirements for a quorum at a shareholders 
 
 80. See H.B. 6, 123rd General Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000). 
 81. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2006). The SEC requires the filing of a preliminary proxy 
statement for proposals other than the election of directors, ratification of accountants or the 
approval of benefit plans.  Id.  This typically extends the proxy process by more than a month, 
requiring earlier preparation of proxy materials and risking additional SEC review. 
 82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.10(A) and 1701.11(A)(1). 
 83. Id. § 1701.11 (A)(1)(d). 
 84. Id. § 1701.40(A)(3). The default percentage of outstanding shares a shareholder or group  
of shareholders must hold in order to call a shareholders meeting is 25%, but can be modified to as 
high as 50% by the articles or the regulations. 
 85. Id. § 1701.41(A). 
 86. Id. § 1701.44(B). 
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meeting;87 
• Prohibit shareholder or director actions from being 
authorized or taken without a meeting;88 
• Define terms of office for directors or provide for 
classification of directors;89 
• Require greater than a majority vote of shareholders to 
remove directors without cause;90 
• Establish requirements for a quorum at directors’ meetings, 
or specify the required vote for an action of the directors;91 
• Delegate authority to committees of the board to adopt, 
amend or repeal regulations;92 or 
• Remove the requirement that a control share acquisition of 
an issuing public corporation be approved by shareholders 
of the acquired corporation.93 
These limitations restrict the directors’ ability to enact amendments 
that could, in the view of the drafters within the Corporation Law 
Committee who originated these provisions of House Bill 301, 
significantly alter the fundamental power of the shareholders versus the 
directors in corporations, or among shareholder groups.94 On the other 
hand, directors can make amendments relating to important but primarily 
ministerial or procedural issues, such as allowing the use of electronic 
proxies, fixing the date and location of meetings, or requiring prior 
 
 87. Id. § 1701.51. 
 88. Id. § 1701.54(A). 
 89. Id. § 1701.57(A), (B). 
 90. Id. §§ 1701.57 and 1701.58(A). 
 91. Id. § 1701.62. 
 92. Id. § 1701.63. 
 93. Id. § 1701.831. 
 94. In presenting the proposals for approval by the Ohio State Bar Association’s Council of 
Delegates, the Corporation Law Committee submitted the following statement: 
In drafting the proposed amendments, the Corporation Law Committee was mindful of 
the careful balancing between our State’s interest in competing with other states as a 
corporate domicile and the need to facilitate corporate procedural change, versus our 
State’s interest in preserving the rights of shareholders to control the governance of their 
corporation and the current public concerns over corporate governance.  Accordingly, 
rather than merely extending to the Directors a broad right to amend corporate 
regulations, the Committee has taken the approach that recognizes that certain matters 
addressed in a corporation’s regulations are fundamental to the relationship between the 
corporation and its shareholders, and should therefore require approval of the 
shareholders for amendment.  The amendments also clarify that the directors’ authority 
to amend the regulations may not be exercised by an executive or other committee of the 
board of directors. 
Corporation Law Committee, Report and Recommendations to the Ohio State Bar 
Association Council of Delegates Meeting (Jan. 21, 2005) (on file with author). 
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notice of nominations or shareholder proposals.95 In no event can 
directors make changes to regulations to restrict the shareholders’ 
authority to adopt, amend, or repeal regulations.96 
Before relying on House Bill 301 to permit director amendment to 
the regulations, an Ohio corporation should check its existing 
regulations. Many will find that their regulations set forth amendment 
provisions that recite the pre-House Bill 301 statutory standard that 
limited amendments to those adopted by shareholders.97 Those 
provisions must themselves be amended by shareholders to opt in to the 
new authorization of director amendments. This outcome is intentional; 
in addition to constitutional concerns about the power of the legislature 
to modify existing regulations, the new authority for director 
amendments is a major change from the status quo, and the drafters 
believed an opt-in statute was appropriate.98 However, new corporations 
may include provisions in their regulations to opt in to the new 
provisions.99 
B. Permitting Spin-Offs Without a Shareholder Vote 
Spin-offs—the distribution by a parent company of the shares of a 
subsidiary to the parent’s shareholders100—are popular capital market 
transactions that allow a public corporation to become more focused on 
its core competencies by separating unlike businesses or maximizing 
shareholder value through higher valuations for the several independent 
business parts as opposed to the consolidated whole. In most states, spin-
offs do not require shareholder approval, no matter how large the 
transaction is, as the concept of a dividend or distribution does not fall 
within the “sale or lease of all or substantially all of the corporation’s 
 
 95. § 1701.11(B). 
 96. Id. The previous version of title 17, section 1701.11(B)(10) of the Ohio Revised Code 
allowed regulations to define, limit or regulate the exercise of authority by the corporation, 
directors, officers or all shareholders. The amendments remove shareholders from that group. Title 
17, section 1701.11(B)(11) of the Ohio Revised Code permits regulations that define, limit or 
regulate the exercise of authority by shareholders, but provides that regulations that change or 
eliminate shareholder authority can only be adopted by shareholders. 
 97. See, e.g., supra note 78 (explaining the delay in SEC filings due to duplication of statutory 
language in corporation regulations). 
 98. H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (Committee Comments to section 
1701.11). 
 99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.15(C) (West 2006). 
 100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th ed. 2004) (defining spin-off as “[a] corporate 
divestiture in which a division of a corporation becomes an independent company and stock of the 
new company is distributed to the corporation’s shareholders”). 
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assets” statutory provisions.101 In contrast, title 17, section 1701.76 of 
the Ohio Revised Code applies to any “transfer, or other disposition of 
all, or substantially all, of the assets . . . of a corporation” and therefore 
can apply to a transfer by dividend or distribution of subsidiary shares.102 
Few cases construe the Ohio statute, adding to the interpretative 
difficulty. This has sometimes resulted in spin-offs being problematic for 
lawyers advising Ohio corporations that seek to achieve a spin-off. 
House Bill 301 amended title 17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio 
Revised Code to allow an “issuing public corporation”103 to spin off a 
subsidiary business to holders of shares in the issuing public corporation 
without shareholder approval.104 Two exceptions could require 
shareholder approval: first, if a spun-off entity is a party to an agreement 
to engage in a subsequent transaction, such as a merger, that would, if 
entered into following the spin-off, have required shareholder approval, 
105 and second, if the issuing public corporation has more than one class 
of shares outstanding immediately prior to the spin-off.106 
The amendment to title 17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised 
Code reflects the continuation of an interesting development in Ohio 
corporate law: the differential treatment of corporations, in this case 
based on the corporation meeting the requirements of being an “issuing 
public corporation.” As defined in title 17, section 1701.01(Y) of the 
Ohio Revised Code, this means “a domestic corporation with fifty or 
more shareholders that has its principal place of business, its principal 
executive offices, assets having substantial value, or a substantial 
percentage of its assets within this state and as to which no valid close 
 
 101. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 271 (2004); CAL CORP. CODE § 1002 (West 2006) 
 102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76(A) (West 2006). 
 103. “Issuing public corporation” is defined as: 
a domestic corporation with fifty or more shareholders that has its principal place of 
business, its principal executive offices, assets having substantial value, or a substantial 
percentage of its assets within this state, and as to which no valid close corporation 
agreement exists under division (H) of section 1701.591 [1701.59.1] of the Revised 
Code. 
§ 1701.01(Y). 
 104. Id. § 1701.76(G). 
 105. Id. § 1701.76(G)(1) as adopted in House Bill 301. Such a transaction might, for example, 
be a “reverse Morris Trust transaction,” in which a spin-off of a subsidiary occurs followed 
immediately by a merger of the spun-off entity with a third party. Robert Willens, Developments in 
the Fields of Accounting and Tax, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 99, 103 (Spring 1999).  An example of 
such a transaction was the acquisition by the J.M. Smucker Company of the Jif-Crisco businesses of 
Procter & Gamble Company in 2002. Kristina Buchthal, Fortune Brands Avoids Hefty Tax Bill in 
Spinoff, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, March 17, 2005, available at http://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-
bin/news.pl?id=15844&rel=1. 
 106. § 1701.76(G)(2). 
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corporation agreement exists. . . .”107 So a public company incorporated 
in Ohio, but lacking other meaningful connections to the state, will not 
benefit from the amendment. And despite the reference to “public” in the 
defined term, the company need not be a public reporting company 
under the federal securities laws.108 
The following examples illustrate how the new provisions of title 
17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code could affect three 
differing spin-off situations: 
Illustration 1: Company A, an issuing public corporation, owns all of 
the shares of Company B and wants to distribute those shares to its 
shareholders. Company A has a single class of shares, and there are no 
existing commitments affecting Company B that would otherwise 
require shareholder approval. With the effectiveness of House Bill 
301’s amendment to title 17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised 
Code, there need no longer be any inquiry into whether Company B 
constitutes all or substantially all of Company A’s assets. 
Illustration 2: The same facts as in Illustration 1, but Company A has, 
in addition to its outstanding Class A (voting) common shares, 
outstanding shares of Class B (non-voting) common shares. Since 
there are two classes of shares outstanding, the relief from title 17, 
section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code does not apply, and whether 
or not Company B constitutes all or substantially all of Company A’s 
assets must be tested. 
Illustration 3: The same facts as in Illustration 1, but shortly before the 
spin-off Company A, as sole shareholder of Company B, and 
Company B have agreed with Company C (an unrelated third party) 
that Company B will merge with and into a subsidiary of Company C. 
As the merger with Company C would, if authorized after the spin-off, 
require the approval of Company B’s shareholders, the relief from title 
17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code does not apply, and 
whether or not Company B constitutes all or substantially all of 
Company A’s assets must be tested. 
C.  Permitting Holding Company Formations without Shareholder 
Approval 
A holding company formation transaction is a transaction in which 
a new parent corporation becomes the sole shareholder of an existing 
 
 107. Id. § 1701.01(Y). 
 108. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2006). 
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company, typically by a merger process involving a third affiliated 
corporation formed solely to effect the merger, and thereby moving the 
shareholders of the old company to the new parent holding company as 
the only shareholders of the parent.109 In essence, the shareholders are 
moved up one tier in the corporation organizational chart, one step 
further removed from the assets used in the business. This process is a 
useful mechanism by which corporate lawyers facilitate the future 
disposition of corporate assets, better match asset ownership with asset 
management, or provide greater protection against liability exposure 
between operating subsidiaries. Under amendments to DGCL §251(g) 
adopted several years ago, the directors of Delaware corporations were 
empowered to create new holding companies without shareholder 
approval and without triggering dissenters’ rights.110 Like Delaware’s 
prior laws, Ohio’s merger provisions as they existed prior to House Bill 
301 required shareholder approval and provided for dissenters’ rights for 
these transactions.111 This made it harder and more expensive for 
corporations to enter into holding company restructuring transactions in 
Ohio, placing Ohio corporations at a relative disadvantage to those in 
Delaware. 
House Bill 301 incorporated the substance of title 8, section 251(g) 
of the Delaware Code into Ohio law through adoption of new title 17, 
section 1701.802 of the Ohio Revised Code. Now, directors of Ohio 
corporations can effect a holding company reorganization without 
shareholder approval and without triggering dissenters’ rights, provided 
that five basic requirements intended to ensure continuity of shareholder 
rights are met: 
(1) The parent112 company and a direct or indirect wholly owned 
subsidiary are the only constituent entities in the merger;113 
(2)  Each outstanding share in the parent corporation before the merger 
 
 109. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.802(A) (West 2006). 
 110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) (2006). 
 111. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.801 (Anderson 1996). 
 112. “Parent” is defined in section 1701.01(P), but section 1701.802 alters the requirements of 
that definition by requiring the parent to directly or indirectly own 100% of the shares of the 
subsidiary, and immediately following the holding company merger, the new holding company 
must directly or indirectly own 100% of the former parent. 
 113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.802(B)(1) (West 2006). This allows the following 
sequence: Company A, a public company, forms Holdco as a direct subsidiary, which in turn forms 
MergerCo, a second-tier subsidiary of Company A.  HoldCo contributes its own shares to 
MergerCo.  Company A merges with MergerCo, becoming a direct subsidiary of HoldCo.  
Company A’s shares are converted into HoldCo shares, MergerCo shares are converted into 
Company A shares, and HoldCo becomes Company A’s parent. 
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is converted into a share in the holding company with the same 
material terms;114 
(3)  The articles and regulations of the holding company after the 
merger are not materially different from those of the parent 
corporation;115 
(4)  As a result of the merger, the parent becomes a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the holding company;116 and 
(5)  The parent corporation’s directors are the directors of the holding 
company after the merger.117 
These requirements are comparable to those that apply in Delaware.118 
Lawyers who make use of new title 17, section 1701.802 of the 
Ohio Revised Code will need to use judgment in determining what 
changes may be made to articles and regulations of the new holding 
company from those of the parent. It should be apparent that the holding 
company’s articles and regulations should be able to differ in those 
provisions that could have been amended by the directors of the original 
corporation without shareholder approval. For example, the new holding 
company should be able to have a different name unless the articles of 
the original corporation prohibited them from changing its name. And if 
the corporation has adopted the flexibility for director amendments to 
the regulations afforded by other sections of House Bill 301, so that its 
own regulations could be amended without shareholder approval, the 
regulations of the new holding company should be able to differ to the 
same degree. But it should be equally apparent that fundamental changes 
— including changes to regulations that could not have been adopted by 
the parent’s directors under the other provisions of House Bill 301 — to 
the corporation would require the approval of the original corporation’s 
shareholders. 
D. Allowing Conversions from One Form of Entity to Another 
At different stages of a business’s development, different business 
entity structures present various advantages and disadvantages. As 
limited liability companies have become more popular, states have 
 
 114. Id. § 1701.802(B)(2). 
 115. Id. § 1701.802(B)(3). 
 116. Id. § 1701.802(B)(4). 
 117. Id. § 1701.802(B)(5). 
 118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) (2006). 
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sought to simplify the statutory mechanisms for changing from one form 
of entity to another.119 The notion of “conversion” — the metaphysical 
change of one form of entity into another, without a change in the entity 
itself — is the simplest approach and was adopted by Delaware in 
1999.120 In the absence of a conversion statute, it was necessary to form 
a new entity, and to merge the old entity into the new entity to change 
the old entity into its new form. 
House Bill 301 provides procedures for business entities to convert 
between organizational forms. Conversions are specifically permitted for 
for-profit corporations,121 limited liability companies,122 limited 
partnerships,123 and partnerships.124 No changes were made to title 17, 
chapter 1702 of the Ohio Revised Code, so there is no conversion 
mechanism into or from a non-profit corporation. 
Dissenters’ rights may apply, unless otherwise restricted, as 
permitted by the statute.125 The legal consequences of conversion are the 
same as what occurs in a merger or consolidation.126 Conversions are 
effected by filing with the Secretary of State’s office.127 
 
 119. See, e.g., S.B. 137, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1999). See also supra notes 121-
24 for Ohio Conversion Statutes. 
 120. S.B. 137, 140th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1999). 
 121. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.782 (West 2006) (discussing conversion from a 
business entity, other than a domestic corporation or nonprofit corporation, to a domestic 
corporation). See also id. § 1705.792 (discussing conversion from a domestic corporation to a 
domestic or foreign business entity, other than a domestic corporation or nonprofit corporation). 
 122. See id. § 1705.361 (discussing conversion from a domestic or foreign business entity (not 
a domestic limited liability company) to a domestic limited liability company). See also id. § 
1705.371 (discussing conversion from a domestic limited liability company to a domestic or foreign 
business entity). 
 123. See id. § 1782.438 (discussing conversion from a domestic or foreign business entity (not 
a domestic limited partnership) to a domestic limited partnership). See also id. § 1782.439 (dealing 
with conversion from a domestic limited partnership to a domestic or foreign business entity). 
 124. See id. § 1775.53 (dealing with conversion from a domestic or foreign business entity (not 
a domestic partnership) to a domestic partnership). See also id. § 1775.54 (dealing with conversion 
from a domestic partnership to a domestic or foreign business entity). 
 125. See id. §§ 1701.84-85 (dealing with corporations); §§ 1705.40-42 (dealing with limited 
liability companies); §§1775.50-51 (dealing with partnerships); §§1782.435-437 (dealing with 
limited partnerships). 
 126. See id. §§ 1701.821 (dealing with corporations); § 1705.391 (dealing with limited liability 
companies); § 1775.56 (dealing with partnerships); § 1782.4311 (dealing with limited partnerships). 
 127. See id.  §§ 111.16(D) (West 2006) (discussing the fee for filing and recording a certificate 
of conversion) and 111.16(K)(2) (fee for creating and affixing the seal of the Secretary of State); § 
1701.811 (discussing corporate conversion certificate filing requirement); § 1705.381 (discussing 
limited liability company conversion certificate filing requirement); § 1775.55 (discussing 
partnership conversion certificate filing requirement); § 1782.4310 (discussing limited partnership 
conversion certificate filing requirement). The provisions for fees chargeable for conversions does 
not become effective until April 10, 2007, but the Secretary of State’s office has committed to effect 
conversions prior to that on a temporary fee schedule. 
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Based on feedback received from practitioners both before and after 
the effectiveness of House Bill 301, the conversion provisions will be 
very useful to many smaller entities and business owners, and they are 
also proving useful to larger companies that wish to convert corporate 
subsidiaries into LLCs, or vice-versa. 
E. Clarifying Option Grant Authority of Officers 
Delaware corporate law authorizes directors to delegate to officers 
the authority to grant employee stock options.128 Prior to House Bill 301, 
some Ohio corporations believed that they were already authorized to 
delegate option-granting authority to officers, notwithstanding statutory 
language that seemed to require director action.129 But many 
practitioners disagreed, believing that the statutory scheme envisions 
option granting to be a fiduciary function of the directors that cannot be 
delegated to non-directors. The OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee 
recognized this situation and believed a statutory clarification was 
desirable.130 
To resolve the disagreement, House Bill 301 amends title 17, 
section 1701.17 of the Ohio Revised Code to expressly authorize 
directors of Ohio corporations to delegate the authority to issue 
employee stock options.131 The directors must specify the total number 
of shares or options the officers may issue and the terms of those shares 
or options.132 The authorized officer may not designate himself or herself 
as the recipient of any shares or options.133 These provisions parallel 
Delaware law.134 
Corporations should take special care when using these delegation 
provisions, as abuse of this discretionary authority may be blamed for 
 
 128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(c) (2006). 
 129. Title 17, section 1701.16(A) of the Ohio Revised Code states “. . .a corporation by its 
directors may grant options. . .”, and section 1701.17 says “[a] corporation by its directors, . . .  may 
provide and carry out plans for the issuance, offering, or sale, or the grant of options . . .” (emphasis 
added). 
 130. In its recommendation to the OSBA Council of Delegates regarding this amendment, the 
Corporation Law Committee said: “Delaware General Corporation Law section 157(c) allows the 
board of directors of Delaware corporations to delegate to one or more officers the authority to grant 
employee stock options.  It is not clear that this authority exists under the corresponding Ohio 
provision.  The proposed language clarifies that this authority exists.” Corporation Law Committee, 
Report and Recommendations to the Ohio State Bar Association Council of Delegates Meeting 11 
(Nov. 7, 2003). 
 131. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.17(B)(1) (West 2006). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. § 1701.17(B)(2). 
 134. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(c) (2006). 
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some cases of “option backdating” that raise serious accounting and 
legal issues.135 Compensation committees and boards of directors should 
limit the scope of the delegated authority and monitor its use. 
F. Clarifying the Creation and Powers of Board Subcommittees 
Following the enactment by Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act136 
in 2002, the demands for board-level activities to be conducted at the 
committee, rather than full board, level exploded, as the New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ formally required the use of committees 
composed of independent directors in crucial areas such as audit, 
nominating, and compensation.137 This placed tremendous pressure on 
outside directors serving on those key committees, often requiring them 
to greatly increase their workloads, especially on smaller boards.138 A 
way around the resulting logjams was thought to be the division and 
further delegation of some of the workload among the committee 
members through creation of subcommittees to consider specific issues 
or aspects of the committee’s role.139 
This practical solution faced the problem that neither title 8 of the 
Delaware Code nor title 17, section 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code 
directly referred to subcommittees. Although there is probably less doubt 
associated with a delegation by directors, or a committee of directors, to 
a subset of their fellows than there is in the delegation of fiduciary 
judgments to non-directors,140 it was still thought best to clarify the 
statute. The Delaware legislature amended title 8, section 141( c)(3) of 
the Delaware Code in 2003 to authorize the use of subcommittees, and 
House Bill 301 followed this lead by amending title 17, section 1701.63 
of the Ohio Revised Code to allow a committee to subdivide itself into 
subcommittees with any or all of the committee’s power and 
authority.141 This power can be limited in the articles, the regulations, or 
by board resolution.142 A subcommittee may consist of one or more 
 
 135. See Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 136. Sabranes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 137. Ben White, Declining a Place at the Table; More Politicians, Executives Say ‘No Thanks’ 
to Director Seats, The WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2003, at E01. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. cmt (Ohio 2005) (Committee Comments to 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (West 2006)). 
 140. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text. 
 141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(3) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (West 2006). 
 142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63(E) (West 2006). 
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directors.143 
G. Allowing SEC Reports to Serve as Notice of Board-Adopted 
Amendments to the Articles 
In 2002, the authority of directors to amend a corporation’s articles 
of incorporation without shareholder approval was expanded.144 
Historically, title 17, section 1701.70 of the Ohio Revised Code had 
authorized directors to independently amend the articles of incorporation 
under five circumstances; this was increased to ten circumstances by the 
2002 amendments.145 At the same time, a new requirement was added to 
title 17, section 1701.73 of the Ohio Revised Code, requiring notice to 
be sent to shareholders within 20 days after the filing of the amendments 
with the Secretary of State.146 After the 2002 amendments became law, it 
was discovered by practitioners that the new notice provision had 
unintended consequences: notices would be required even if the action 
taken by the directors fell into one of the five historical categories, not 
just one of the five new categories.147 Further, there was a potentially 
high cost associated with these notices for large public companies that 
have many shareholders of record. In response to these practical 
concerns, House Bill 301 amended title 17, section 1701.73 of the Ohio 
Revised Code to allow companies that file periodic public reports with 
the SEC under sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to meet these notice provisions through those filings.148 For 
corporations with a large number of shareholders, this should provide 
significant future savings. 
 
 143. The decision to permit one-member subcommittees is in line with the prior 1998 
amendment to title 17, section 1701.63 of the Ohio Revised Code that allowed committees to be 
reduced to a single member from the prior requirement of at least three directors.  As the committee 
comment to the prior legislation said: “Recent changes in regulations under federal tax and 
securities laws have encouraged the use of smaller committees.”  In addition, the 1986 amendments 
to the Ohio General Corporation Law permitting corporations to eliminate cumulative voting, 
together with Ohio decisions interpreting the fiduciary duties of majority shareholders to minority 
shareholders, have eliminated the need for a statute setting the size of committees.”  See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1701.63 cmt. (Ohio General Corporation Law Committee comment) (reprinted in 
PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, supra note 25, at 118). 
 144. See § 1701.70 (adopted in H.B. 278, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., (Ohio 2002)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. § 1701.73(a). 
 147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.73 (West 2004).  For example, a corporation was required 
to mail notice of the directors’ adoption of an articles amendment that eliminated references in the 
articles to a class of shares that had been redeemed as allowed in title 17, section 1701.70(B)(3).  Id.  
 148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.73(A)(3) (West 2006). 
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H. Broadening Permissible Consideration for Shares 
In June 2004, title 8 of the Delaware Code was amended to broaden 
the range of permissible consideration for the issuance of shares.149 The 
Delaware revisions reflected contemporary business economics and 
corporate transactional practice. These changes led the Corporation Law 
Committee to analyze title 17, section 1701.18 of the Ohio Revised 
Code, which governs the consideration acceptable for the payment for 
shares. That provision limited the forms of payment that corporations 
could accept in exchange for the issuance of shares to “money or other 
property of any description, or any interest in property, actually 
transferred to the corporation, or labor or services actually rendered to 
the corporation.”150 These restrictions meant that shares could not be 
issued in exchange for future services, as a signing bonus, or for the 
prospective value of a relationship. 
House Bill 301 amends title 17, section 1701.18 of the Ohio 
Revised Code to allow for a much broader range of acceptable 
consideration for shares. An Ohio corporation may now accept “cash, 
property, services rendered, a promissory note, or any other binding 
obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services; the 
provision of any other benefit to the corporation; or any combination of 
these” as valid consideration for shares.151 The catch-all language, “any 
other benefit,” is intentionally broad. Valuation of the benefit to the 
corporation is left to the directors.152 Under the amended language, while 
shares may now be issued in consideration of a promise to perform 
services in the future, such shares remain “unpaid” until the services are 
performed.153 In a parallel amendment contained in House Bill 301, 
limited liability companies were authorized to also accept any of these 
forms of consideration in exchange for membership interests.154 
I. Recognizing Corporate Actions In Accordance With Bankruptcy 
Court Orders 
Both title 8 of the Delaware Code and title 17, chapter 1701 of the 
Ohio Revised Code have for many years recognized that a federal 
 
 149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.  8, §§152, 154, 157 (2006). 
 150. See H.B. 301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (2006) (deleting portions of section 
1701.18(A)(1)). 
 151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.18(A)(1) (West 2006). 
 152. See id. § 1701.19(A), (B). 
 153.  Id. § 1701.18(C). 
 154. See id. § 1705.09 (stating that contributions of “any benefit to the limited liability 
company” suffice). 
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bankruptcy court could, in a bankruptcy plan of reorganization, take 
actions (for example, charter amendments or mergers) concerning a 
corporation that ordinarily would require director and/or shareholder 
action under non-bankruptcy conditions.155 Both title 8, section 303 of 
the Delaware Code and title 17, section 1701.75 of the Ohio Revised 
Code permitted companies undergoing reorganization in bankruptcy 
proceedings to accomplish these actions under a plan of 
reorganization.156 Such plans are adopted in reorganizations under 
chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, but not in liquidations under 
either that chapter or chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Also, 
some preliminary corporate actions will, even in reorganizations under 
chapter 11, fall outside the prior provisions of title 17, section 1701.75 
of the Ohio Revised Code.157 
In August 2004, title 8, section 303 of the Delaware Code was 
amended to permit corporate activity under any order or decree from a 
federal bankruptcy court without director or shareholder approval, thus 
expanding the law’s scope to include liquidations as well as 
reorganizations.158 House Bill 301 contains a parallel amendment in title 
17, section 1701.75 of the Ohio Revised Code.159 This change should 
reduce the problems that practitioners would face when presenting 
bankruptcy court-approved documents to the Ohio Secretary of State’s 
office that formerly did not appear to be authorized by chapter 1701. 
J. Reliance on Certificates of Good Standing 
Ohio corporate lawyers and others who worry about whether a 
corporation is validly existing and in good standing at the time the 
corporation undertakes a contract or engages in business have 
historically faced a concern over how much reliance they could take on 
the “good standing” certificates issued by Ohio’s Secretary of State. 
 
 155. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.75 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1991). 
 156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.75 (West 2006). 
 157. For example, the sale of assets constituting substantially all (but not all) of the assets of 
the debtor corporation could have been authorized under applicable Federal bankruptcy principles 
pursuant to a order of the bankruptcy court prior to the entry of a plan of reorganization; under title 
17, section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code, this would have required the approval of the 
shareholders but Federal bankruptcy procedures would have ignored this state law 
requirement.  Similarly, the bankruptcy court could have ordered the merger of subsidiaries into the 
debtor corporation; under section 1701.80 of the Ohio Revised Code this would require approval by 
directors of each corporation.  The amendments to section 1701.75 eliminate these state 
law requirements. 
 158. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (2006). 
 159. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.75 (West 2006). 
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Although custom and practice in corporate business transactions require 
reliance by lawyers, title insurers, and others on these good standing 
certificates, the reality is that a corporation’s good standing may change 
in a single day, without notice to someone who received the Secretary of 
State’s certification earlier that day. As a result of concerns from lawyers 
who understood the potential for embarrassment, if not malpractice, for 
opinions as to good standing that were given in reliance on a certificate 
that was literally untrue at the moment it was relied on, House Bill 301 
amends title 17, section 1701.92 of the Ohio Revised Code to define 
“good standing” and to expressly allow reliance on a certificate of good 
standing issued by the Secretary of State.160 The new language provides 
that a person may rely on a certificate of good standing for a period of 
seven days after the date on the certificate, provided that person had no 
knowledge that the corporation’s articles had been canceled and the 
certificate is not presented as evidence against the State.161 This makes it 
easier to complete transaction closings because it provides a window of 
time during which reliance on the certificate is legally justified, 
eliminating the possible need for obtaining “bring-down” certificates 
from the Secretary of State and the Ohio tax division. 
III.  WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 
As the chart earlier in this article shows, House Bill 301 is but one 
step in the continuing evolution of Ohio corporate law.162 Many changes 
have already occurred; Ohio is making good progress in “keeping up 
with Delaware.” But we know that law is not static, and that more 
change is ahead of us. What might these changes be? Here are some 
changes that we may see in the future. 
A.  Majority Voting Proposals 
The OSBA Council of Delegates has already approved a 
recommendation by the Corporation Law Committee to support 
 
 160. House Bill 301 provides that the certificate of good standing is conclusive evidence that: 
(1)  a domestic corporation’s authority has not been limited under dissolution 
provisions, as long as 
  (a)  the person relying on the certificate had no knowledge that the articles had been 
canceled, and 
  (b) the certificate is not presented as evidence against the state; and 
(2)  a foreign corporation’s license to transact business in Ohio has not expired, been 
canceled or been surrendered. 
 161. See § 1701.92(D)(1). 
 162. See supra pp. 178-84. 
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legislation to amend title 17, section 1701.55 of the Ohio Revised Code 
to clearly permit Ohio corporations to amend their articles of 
incorporation to provide for majority voting in the election of 
directors.163 This change is necessary in order to respond to a 
groundswell of shareholder activists who believe that the current 
plurality standard that has been the general rule in U.S. corporate 
elections undercuts “shareholder democracy” and promotes 
entrenchment of management.164 This is part of a much larger national 
fight to give shareholders more influence over who serves as directors of 
America’s public corporations.165 While there are many who believe the 
current system works well, the voting results in 2006 show that many 
shareholders believe otherwise, as at least 36 shareholder proposals 
seeking majority voting standards received majority support from 
shareholders.166 
Delaware law has historically allowed its corporations to opt in to 
majority voting requirements.167 However, Delaware recently adopted a 
package of legislative changes to numerous sections of title 8 of the 
Delaware Code to better accommodate majority voting, for example by 
allowing conditional director resignations to be effective at a later 
date.168 In the author’s view, these changes are not necessary in Ohio 
because existing law already permits such resignations.169 
 
 163. OHIO STATE CAR ASSOCIATION COUNCIL OF DELEGATES, FALL 2006 MEETING, 10 
available at http://downloads.ohiobar.org/pubs/council_files/Report_of_the_Corporation_Law_ 
Committee_Fa06.pdf. The suggested language would insert “Unless the articles otherwise provide,” 
at the beginning of title 17, section 1701.55 of the Ohio Revised Code’s current language. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. The following is an excerpt from a report from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a 
leading advisor to institutional investors: 
According to ISS records, shareholders filed 84 majority election proposals that came to 
a vote in the first half of 2006. This compares with 54 proposals that came to a vote in 
the first six months of 2005, and 12 in 2004. For the first half of 2006, shareholder 
support for these majority vote proposals averaged 47.7 percent (compared with 44.3 
percent during the first half of 2005). And by August 2006, 36 proposals had received 
more than 50 percent support, nearly triple the number in 2005. In 2004, these proposals 
averaged less than 12 percent of votes in favor, without a single proposal winning a 
majority. 
ISS Governance Center, Governance Weekly, http://www.issproxy.com/governance/publications/ 
2007archived/005.jsp (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). 
 167. See S.B. 322, 143rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2006). 
 168. Id. at § 3 (amending 8 DEL ALS § 141(b)). 
 169. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.58(A) (West 2006) (“A resignation shall take effect 
immediately or at such other time as the director may specify.”). The use of the word “time,” rather 
than “date” as previously used in title 8 of the Delaware Code and the MBCA, allows the director to 
fix a set of conditions upon which the resignation becomes effective. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
223(d) (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.07(b) (2006). 
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The author expects that the majority voting amendment would 
become part of a legislative proposal this year. 
B.  Responding to Hollinger Dicta 
In Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc.,170 Vice Chancellor 
Strine’s opinion contained dicta that caused concern to Delaware 
lawyers regarding the application of Delaware’s “sale of all or 
substantially all” statutes, title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code, in 
holding company situations.171 Thus, the question: Are sales of assets 
held by subsidiaries covered by the statute, or only assets held directly 
by the corporation? Conversely, are sales of assets to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries subject to title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code, or not? 
In 2006, Delaware responded to these concerns with legislation that 
amended title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code to clarify that the 
statute indeed covers assets held by direct and indirect wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, and that sales to subsidiaries are not covered by the 
statute.172 
Ohio’s analog to title 8, section 171 of the Delaware Code, as 
previously discussed in connection with House Bill 301, is title 17, 
section 1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code.173 The Corporation Law 
Committee has recently approved proposed language that would, if 
approved by the OSBA Council of Delegates, be part of a future 
legislative package.174 The language generally adopts the Delaware 
approach. In the author’s view, this would not be a change from current 
interpretations of Ohio law, but the changes would remove any doubt 
and assist in advising clients. 
C.  Eliminating the Opt-Out Waiting Period for Cumulative Voting 
In 1986, Ohio reversed its historic requirement that corporations 
must permit cumulative voting in the election of directors, allowing 
 
 170. 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 171. Id. at 373. 
 172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 171 (2006). 
 173. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (West 2006). 
 174. The Committee Comment is as follows: 
This amendment clarifies that (1) the “sale of all or substantially all assets” provision 
under ORC §1701.76 applies to sales of assets whether owned directly by a corporation 
or owned indirectly through one or more layers of wholly owned entities, and (2) the 
section does not apply to downstream movement of assets from a corporation to its to 
wholly-owned subsidiary entities.  
 Id. (Corporation Law Committee Comments, approved 2006). 
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corporations to opt out of that requirement by amending their articles of 
incorporation.175 When those amendments were adopted, it was thought 
too radical to allow newly formed corporations to immediately opt out of 
cumulative voting, and instead a 90 day waiting period was imposed.176 
The Corporation Law Committee recently concluded that the waiting 
period is no longer desirable and has recommended that the waiting 
period be eliminated.177 The author anticipates that this would be 
combined with the amendment described above to title 17, section 
1701.76 of the Ohio Revised Code for consideration by the OSBA 
Council of Delegates and, if approved, be part of a future legislative 
package. 
D.  And There Will be More! 
The OSBA’s Corporation Law Committee is constantly looking to 
improve Ohio’s entity statutes. Ideas for change flow in from 
practitioners around the state. Some die an early death, others move 
quickly into legislation, while yet others percolate through the 
Committee’s processes for years. No one can predict precisely what 
future changes will be. What is certain is that there will be changes. Who 
knows, someday we may accomplish my own pet project: the 
elimination of stated capital as a statutory concept!178 
 
 175. See §§ 1701.04 (discussing the contents of articles of incorporation) and 1701.69 
(discussing the amendments to articles). 
 176. Id. § 1701.04(E). 
 177. See supra, note 174. 
 178. See, for example, the use of stated capital in §§ 1701.30, 1701.31, 1701.32, 1701.34 and 
1701.35.  Bayless Manning asked the questions: 
Does the present day statutory legal capital machinery made up of par value, stated 
capital, and related non-economic concepts – controlled as it is by the shareholders, 
directors and their lawyers and accountants – effectively perform any significant relevant 
function in protecting creditors of corporations? . . .Is anything more needed than the 
Massachusetts provision forbidding a distribution to shareholders if the company is 
insolvent or if it would be rendered insolvent by the distribution?  
BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 108 (New York, Foundation Press 
1971). His answer to each of these questions: “No.”  Id. Stay tuned. 
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